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THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT MISSED THE BULLSEYE
IN WALLEYE
Peter Rosenberg*
ABSTRACT
The structure of agency relationships in a transaction should have no
bearing on the outcome when the only difference between two
hypothetical transactions is solely the facial structure. In the same
vein, investor protection is at the forefront of the securities laws;
commonly used limiting language for market announcements should
not be enough to absolve a company from fraudulent disclosures,
e.g., “preliminary results.”
In Walleye Trading LLC v. AbbVie, Inc.,† a Seventh Circuit decision,
the Court did the opposite and found that, based on pleadings at the
motion to dismiss stage, an issuer is not liable for the misstatements
of an outside agent in preliminary Dutch auction tender offer results.
This finding is even more shocking when taking into account that the
issuer had access to the raw data suitable to find and correct the
misstatement.
The ruling created an effective safe harbor for dissemination of
hastily prepared information. Alone, the typical market practice of
releasing preliminary tender offer results seems innocuous; but when
paired with the reactionary nature of the market, it can guess
artificial changes in stock pricing, and therefore harm investors, on
an artificial basis. Insert bad actors, and the safe harbor allows them
to utilize the artificial changes in pricing to game the market.
The safe harbor needs to be closed. The rise in retail investor market
participation evidences a need for greater investor protections.
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Without this change, the market is set to lose investor confidence,
which is especially important as retail investing reaches all-time
highs.
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INTRODUCTION
Yudhijit Bhattacharjee, a journalist writing about the science of
lying, stated: “Our capacity for dishonesty is as fundamental to us as our
need to trust others, which ironically makes us terrible at detecting lies.
Being deceitful is woven into our very fabric, so much so that it would
be truthful to say that to lie is human.”1 To protect the nest eggs of
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Americans and the economy from collapse, the securities laws were
adopted to limit lying and untruthfulness.
Rule 10b-5 (the “Rule”),2 which interprets the securities laws,
embraces the idea that the nation’s securities markets, private and
public, should be honest places. In the words of Professor Charles
Murdock, in these markets, it is “‘sinful’ not just to lie, but to tell halftruths as well.”3 This is based in the spirit of the securities laws: Caveat
emptor has no place in the United States’ capital markets.4 These laws
are intended to embody the spirit of full and fair disclosure, creating a
high standard of business ethics.5
Neither Section 10(b) nor Rule 10b-5 of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 (the “Securities Exchange Act” or “‘34 Act”) creates
a private right of action.6 The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) is tasked with enforcing the intended full and fair disclosure; 7
however, the Supreme Court has created an implied private right of
action under Rule 10b-5.8
Under the private implied right of action, private litigants can only
bring suits against primary violators of the Rule.9 A primary violator is
the person who holds the ultimate responsibility for the making of the
untruthful statement, or another violation of the rule.10 A person or
entity who helps to prepare an untruthful statement, or another violation
of the rule, would be an aider or abettor.11

1. Why Lying Is Human Nature, AXIOS (May 23, 2017), https://www.axios.com/
why-lying-is-human-nature-1513302505-c8487b94-a3ed-4d0d-b4e8-feb5fa5a0ffb.html
[https://perma.cc/HK4V-3NY7].
2. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5.
3. Charles W. Murdock, Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders:
The Culmination of the Supreme Court’s Evolution From Liberal to Reactionary in
Rule 10b-5 Actions, 91 DENV. UNIV. L. REV. 369, 373 (2014).
4. See SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 819 (2002) (first quoting United States v.
O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 658 (1997); then quoting Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v.
United States, 406 U.S. 128, 151 (1972)).
5. See Zandford, 535 U.S. at 819 (quoting O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 658).
6. Janus Cap. Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 564 U.S. 135, 142 (2011)
(citing Superintendent of Ins. of N.Y. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 & n.9
(1971)).
7. Zandford, 535 U.S. at 819.
8. Janus Cap. Grp., 564 U.S. at 142.
9. See id.
10. See id.
11. Id. at 143.
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By the Supreme Court’s interpretation, “Rule 10b-5’s private right
of action does not include suits against aiders and abettors . . . .
[P]ersons or entities without control over the content of a statement” are
not the “primary violators who ‘made’ the statement,” and therefore
cannot be held liable.12 An individual who is not the primary violator
would hold secondary liability.13 “Even when a speechwriter drafts
a speech, the content is entirely within the control of the person who
delivers it . . . . [I]t is the speaker who takes credit—or blame—for what
is ultimately said.”14 When a person makes a statement, they are liable
for the information contained in the statement.15 Even if the person did
not write his own statement, he has total control over what he says and
does.16 If a speaker, who would typically be a primary violator,
explicitly attributes his statement to another, the attribution is persuasive
evidence that it is not the speaker’s statement, but the person to whom
it is attributed.17
The Seventh Circuit created an effective safe harbor to primary
liability for making a false statement in Walleye Trading LLC
v. AbbVie, Inc.18 Circuit Judge Frank Easterbrook, writing for the court,
effectively raised the pleading standard to sufficiently allege securities
fraud in a specific circumstance.19 A panel of the Seventh Circuit
affirmed a decision by the Northern District of Illinois, ruling that
allegations of recklessness by a contractor in creating information and
the release of this information by an issuer, who had access to the data
to confirm the statement, are not sufficient to establish that the issuer
acted with scienter if the information disclosed was “accurately
reported” from the information supplied to the principal.20
The Seventh Circuit’s decision is directly contrary to the spirit
of the securities laws.21 However, it is possible to harmonize the Seventh
Circuit’s interpretation with the spirit of the securities laws and guidance

12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

Id.
See id. at 152.
Id. at 143.
Id. at 142–44.
Id.
Id. at 142–43.
See generally Walleye Trading LLC v. AbbVie, Inc., 962 F.3d 975 (7th Cir.
2020) (affirming the Northern District of Illinois’ ruling to dismiss Plaintiff’s
allegations of fraud under Rule 10b-5(b) and Section 10(b) of the ‘34 Act).
19. Id.
20. See id. at 978.
21. See infra Parts II–III.
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of the Supreme Court’s case law. The effective safe harbor allows an
issuer to rely on the work of an outside agent in its own written or verbal
statements to evade liability. This is so long as the issuer explicitly
attributes the statement to the outside agent. This use of an outside agent
is a bar to liability established through the agent’s, and potentially the
issuer’s, recklessness. Without this liability, only the outside agent
is responsible under secondary liability to the SEC and the private
litigant has no path for pecuniary relief.
Instead of allowing the safe harbor to shield issuers, the Seventh
Circuit—or the SEC—could establish a new duty to confirm data, when
bases are available, or create somewhat arbitrary but necessary
guidelines for an issuer’s transactions over a certain aggregate value.
This is not the proper solution. The effective safe harbor should be
reversed by the Seventh Circuit, the Supreme Court on a potential
appeal, or supplemented by SEC rulemaking. Keeping the safe harbor
will allow harm to investors and provide artificial price fluctuations in
the capital markets.
I. THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT, THE SUPREME COURT, AND
OCCASIONALLY THE SECOND CIRCUIT.
It is necessary to recite judicially created standards before
discussing the safe harbor itself. The standards to be discussed include
first, the standard for Rule 10b-5 claims set by the Supreme Court;
second, the Seventh Circuit’s interpretation of this baseline; and third,
the Second Circuit’s interpretation of this baseline. Lastly, the pleading
standards to satisfy the recklessness standards are set forth.
A. THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT’S STANDARDS
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 states:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use
of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the
mails, or of any facility of any national securities exchange . . .
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or
sale of any security registered on a national securities
exchange or any security not so registered . . . any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in
contravention of such rules and regulations as the
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Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in
the public interest or for the protection of investors.22

The SEC, under the authority granted by Section 10(b),
promulgated Rule 10b-5 to define manipulative or deceptive devices as:
(a)

To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,

(b)
To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit
to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements
made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made,
not misleading, or
(c)
To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in
connection with the purchase or sale of any security.23

The elements of a Section 10(b) claim are:
(1)

A material misrepresentation or omission;

(2)

Scienter;

(3)

Reliance;

(4)

Economic loss; and

(5)

Loss causation.24

As illustrated above, in a test articulated by the Supreme Court:
“To establish liability under . . . Rule 10b-5, a private plaintiff must
prove that the defendant acted with scienter . . . .”25 Every federal circuit
court of appeals has found that recklessness can constitute the requisite
scienter; although the federal circuit courts of appeals have derived
different tests.26
The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (“PSLRA”), which
heightened pleading standards for Section 10(b) and consequently Rule
10b-5, requires a private securities complaint alleging a false
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (Section 10 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934).
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1951) (Rule 10b-5).
See Anchor Bank, FSB v. Hofer, 649 F.3d 610, 617 (7th Cir. 2011).
Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 319 (2007).
See id. at 319 n.3 (citing Ottman v. Hanger Orthopedic Grp., Inc., 353 F.3d
338, 343 (4th Cir. 2003)).
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or misleading statement to “(1) specify each statement alleged to have
been misleading and the reason or reasons the statement is misleading;
and (2) state with particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that
the defendant acted with the required state of mind.”27 The complaint as
a whole, with all of its allegations taken together, must establish the
required strong inference.28 But, even on a motion to dismiss, plausible
opposing inferences must be taken into account.29
In reality, “the inquiry is inherently comparative: How likely is it
that one conclusion, as compared to others, follows from the underlying
facts?”30 “[P]ersons or entities without control over the content of a
statement” are not the “primary violators who ‘made’ the statement,”
and therefore cannot be held liable for it.31 An individual who is not the
primary violator would hold secondary liability.32 “Even when
a speechwriter drafts a speech, the content is entirely within the control
of the person who delivers it . . . . [I]t is the speaker who takes credit—
or blame—for what is ultimately said.”33 When a person makes
a statement, they are liable for the information contained in the
statement.34 Even if the person did not write his own statement, he has
total control of what he says and does.35 If a speaker, who would
typically be a primary violator, explicitly attributes his statement to
another, the attribution is persuasive evidence that it is not the speaker’s
statement, but the statement of the person to whom it is attributed.36
The Supreme Court has found that “[c]onduct itself can be
deceptive”; acts or statements can be relied upon by investors, and as

27. Id. at 321 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1)-(2)) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (discussing the PSLRA and its requirements in place of those established
through federal common law by the individual circuit courts of appeal in interpreting
Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b)).
28. Id. at 322–23.
29. Id. (reversing the Seventh Circuit’s analysis of § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 motion
to dismiss based on reasonable inference from the pleadings).
30. Id. at 323.
31. See id.
32. See id.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 141–43.
35. Id.
36. Id.
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a result, conduct can establish liability.37 Therefore, any discussion of
liability, in theory, can apply to conduct itself.
Aiding and abetting liability—which is the liability of secondary
actors who are tangentially related to the maker of a statement or actor
engaging in deceptive conduct—cannot be obtained in a private action
under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.38 Aiding and abetting liability
is solely actionable by the SEC.39 It applies when a misstatement
or omission was made by a party with no privity to the harmed
investor.40 This is effectively an extension of the reliance prong of a
Rule 10b-5 claim because the investor must rely on the action of the
defendant for a private action.41 If harmed investors were able to bring
private rights of action against aiding and abetting entities, the investors
would be able to circumvent establishing reliance, thereby disregarding
the artificial limits placed on private liability under Rule 10b-5.42 Issuers
are often not primarily liable for misrepresentations or omissions made
by their agents as long as the issuer acted in good faith.43 The attribution
of acts and statements is discussed further below.44
Conversely, aiding and abetting liability—where liability
is imposed on secondary actors—can result when a principal relays
statements made by an agent containing misstatements or omissions. 45
The maker of a statement, not the preparer, is ultimately liable for any
misrepresentation or misleading element of the statement.46 Liability of

37. See Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Sci.-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 158
(2008) (citing Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 476–77 (1977) as an
example) (applying the logical equivalent of this statement to find that non-corporate
defendant with no public statements, misrepresentations, or omissions is not liable to
private investor as aiding and abetting).
38. Id. at 157–58 (citation omitted).
39. Id. at 158 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78t(e)).
40. Id. at 158–59.
41. See id. at 159.
42. Id. at 157 (quoting Cent. Bank, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank, N.A., 511 U.S.
164, 180 (1994), superseded by statute on other grounds).
43. Hollinger v. Titan Cap. Corp., 914 F.2d 1564, 1578 (9th Cir. 1990). Contra
Vento & Co. of N.Y. v. Metromedia Fiber Network, No. 97 Civ. 7751 (JGK), 1999 WL
147732, at *12–13 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 18, 1999).
44. See infra Section II.C.
45. Cf. Janus Cap. Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 564 U.S. 135, 142–43
(2011).
46. Id. But see AT&T v. Winback & Conserve Program, 42 F.3d 1421, 1430–31
(3d Cir. 1994) (analyzing Cent. Bank, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank, N.A., 511 U.S. 164
(1994), superseded by statute on other grounds, and finding that between Justice
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an agent for his actions, and respondeat superior liability for the
principal, is a common law doctrine; the common law doctrine is
inapplicable to Rule 10b-5 private implied right of action claims.47 It is
still possible that an aider and abettor can be primarily liable in certain
circumstances.48
B. THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT’S INTERPRETATION
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals defines recklessness
sufficient to establish scienter for a Rule 10b-5 claim as acting where
“the danger of misleading [investors is] known or so obvious that any
reasonable man would be legally bound as knowing, and the [material
misstatement, or otherwise,] must derive from something more
egregious than even ‘white heart/empty head’ good faith.”49
In an elaboration, the Seventh Circuit wrote that “reckless conduct”
can be sufficient to constitute scienter.50
Reckless conduct may be defined as a highly unreasonable omission,
involving not merely simple, or even inexcusable negligence, but an
extreme departure from the standards of ordinary care, and which
presents a danger of misleading buyers or sellers that is either known
to the defendant or is so obvious that the actor must have been aware
of it.51

This “is akin to a [common law] reckless[ness] standard though
phrased in terms of ‘blinded by conflict of interest’ and ‘wantonly
ignored.’”52 But this definition is restricted because “the definition of
‘reckless behavior’ should not be a liberal [test] lest any discernible
distinction between ‘scienter’ and ‘negligence’ be obliterated for these
purposes.”53 Recklessness is “a lesser form of [voluntary] intent [but

Kennedy’s majority opinion and Justice Stevens’ dissent, common law doctrines such
as respondeat superior do not apply to private § 10(b) actions as to prevent holding
secondary actors liable under aiding and abetting liability).
47. See Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC, 552 U.S. at 157.
48. See, e.g., Novak v. Kasaks, 216 F.3d 300, 311 (2d Cir. 2000) (listing
circumstances that would be probative or satisfy a finding of scienter).
49. Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 553 F.2d 1033, 1045 (7th Cir. 1977).
50. Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., 554 F.2d 790, 792 (7th Cir. 1977).
51. Id. at 793 (adopting standard from Sundstrand Corp., 553 F.2d at 1033).
52. Id.
53. Id.
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greater than] ordinary negligence” which is an inherently different
standard and not just a sliding scale.54
The Seventh Circuit and associated district courts have yet to
directly address any possible exceptions to explicit attribution in
a statement to another speaker.55
Due to the absence of Seventh Circuit case law determining
exceptions to explicit attribution, other tests or standards can be adopted
to fill this gap. Another standard may not fit squarely into the gap being
filled but may provide guidance to a reviewing court. One possible test
is one that determines whether allegations of erroneous accounting
statements can establish scienter.
In 2000, in Chu v. Sabratek Corp.,56 the Northern District of Illinois
articulated a fairly novel test to determine whether allegations of
erroneous accounting statements can establish scienter.57 According to
this court, the factors relevant to whether preparation of erroneous
statements is evidence of scienter are:

54.
55.

(1)

Magnitude of the accounting error;

(2)

Facts showing that the defendants had prior notice of the
error; and

(3)

Whether a defendant was responsible for calculating and
disseminating the financial information.58

Id.
See, e.g., Lane v. Money Masters, Inc., No. 14-CV-1715, 2015 WL 225427, at
*8 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 15, 2015) (discussing applicability of respondeat superior liability for
principal when statement is made and attributed to agent); SEC v. Benger, 931 F. Supp.
2d 908, 911 (N.D. Ill. 2013) (citing SEC v. Carter, No. 10 C 6145, 2011 WL 5980966,
at *1 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 28, 2011)) (finding that drafter of distributed statement is not liable
for actionable misstatement, but allegations that the maker of the statement who
ultimately approved and adopted the statement is sufficient to establish scienter for
purposes of a motion to dismiss). But see McConville v. SEC, 465 F.3d 780, 787 (7th
Cir. 2006) (finding insider who prepared Form 10-K with financial misstatements liable
even though she did not sign the form).
56. 100 F. Supp. 2d 827, 837–39 (N.D. Ill. 2000) (analyzing non-compliance with
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (“GAAP”) in preparing financial
statements).
57. See id. at 837–39.
58. See id. at 838.
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This test has not been evaluated by the Seventh Circuit, but it has been
used throughout the lower courts under the Seventh Circuit, primarily in
the Northern District of Illinois.59
C. THE SECOND CIRCUIT’S INTERPRETATION
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals similarly defines recklessness
as acting with “an intent to deceive, manipulate or defraud,”60
established for purposes of pleading by “alleging facts . . . constituting
strong circumstantial evidence of conscious misbehavior or
recklessness.”61 The Second Circuit Court of Appeals further defines
recklessness as ignoring “a clear duty to disclose . . . facts supporting
a strong inference of ‘conscious recklessness—i.e., a state of mind
approximating actual intent, and not merely a heightened form of
negligence,’ . . .”62
An inference of scienter may be based on recklessness when “the
defendants: (1) benefitted in a concrete and personal way from the
purported fraud . . . (2) engaged in deliberately illegal behavior . . .
(3) knew facts or had access to information suggesting that their public
statements were not accurate . . . or (4) failed to check information they
had a duty to monitor . . .”63 Contrary to the Seventh Circuit, the Second
Circuit has explicitly stated “that the inference [of scienter] may arise
where the complaint sufficiently alleges that the defendants . . . knew

59. E.g., In re Motorola Sec. Litig., No. 03 C 287, 2004 WL 2032769, at *27 (N.D.
Ill. Sept. 9, 2004); SEC v. Sys. Software Assocs., 145 F. Supp. 2d 954, 958 (N.D. Ill.
2001); In re SCB Comput. Tech., Inc., 149 F. Supp. 2d 334, 350 (W.D. Tenn. 2001);
see also, e.g., In re Rent-Way Sec. Litig., 209 F. Supp. 2d 493, 508–09 (W.D. Pa.
2002).
60. Setzer v. Omega Healthcare Invrs., Inc., 968 F.3d 204, 212 (2d Cir. 2020)
(quoting Ganino v. Citizens Utilities Co., 228 F.3d 154, 168 (2d Cir. 2000)).
61. Id. (quoting ATSI Commc’ns, Inc. v. Shaar Fund, Ltd., 493 F.3d 87, 99 (2d
Cir. 2007)).
62. Id. at 213 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Stratt-McClure v. Morgan Stanley, 776
F.3d 94, 106 (2d Cir. 2015)).
63. Novak v. Kasaks, 216 F.3d 300, 311 (2d Cir. 2000). The Seventh Circuit
disagreed with the Second Circuit’s interpretation of the PSLRA in determining the
standard for pleadings and their requirements as intended by Congress in Makor Issues
& Right, Ltd. v. Tellabs, Inc., 437 F.3d 588, 601 (7th Cir. 2006), rev’d by, 551 U.S. 308
(2007). While the Second Circuit’s interpretation of the pleading was stricter than that
decided by the Supreme Court, the Seventh Circuit’s interpretation was expressly
overturned. Id.; Tellabs, Inc., 551 U.S. at 322.
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facts or had access to information suggesting that their public statements
were not accurate . . . [or] failed to check information they had a duty to
monitor.”64
Applying the above to statements with clear and explicit attribution,
the Southern District of New York has repeatedly stated: “[E]xplicit
attribution is not absolutely dispositive.”65 “[T]he proper inquiry is
whether a plaintiff sufficiently pleads that a particular defendant ‘made
it necessary or inevitable that any falsehood would be contained in the
statement.’”66 Further, the Second Circuit has elaborated that “a plaintiff
must prove that an agent of the corporation committed a culpable act
with the requisite scienter, and that the act (and the accompanying
mental state) are attributable to the corporation.”67 This is typically used
for finding corporate scienter.68 But the limits to this test are potentially
susceptible to ambiguity given the multitude of principal-agent
relationships incidental to the corporate form.

64.
65.

Novak, 216 F.3d at 311 (internal citations omitted).
Doubleline Cap. LP v. Odebrecht Fin., Ltd., 323 F. Supp. 3d 393, 452
(S.D.N.Y. 2018) (quoting IOP Cast Iron Holding, LLC v. J.H. Whitney Cap. Partners,
LLC, 91 F. Supp. 3d 456, 473 (S.D.N.Y. 2015)). In Doubleline Capital LP, Judge
Woods of the S.D.N.Y. explained:
[T]here is not even a suggestion in Plaintiffs’ allegations that Odebrecht Finance
‘made it necessary or inevitable’ that CNO’s false and misleading disclosures
would be contained in the offering memoranda. Rather, as the documents
themselves show, CNO prepared the offering memoranda; CNO attested to the
accuracy of its disclosures contained in the offering memoranda; and CNO
accepted responsibility for the accuracy of its statements. There is no indication
that Odebrecht Finance either ratified CNO’s financial disclosures or had any role
in the preparation of the offering memoranda . . . . In light of Janus’s clear
rejection of [this] argument . . . the Court cannot conclude that on these
allegations, Odebrecht Finance was a maker of CNO’s financial statements
contained in the offering memoranda.

Id. (quoting Janus, 564 U.S. at 146–47). Odebrecht is the parent company of CNO.
CNO was alleged to have been bribing a Latin American government to attain
opportunities for success. The claimed success in the offering memoranda of CNO was
allegedly misleading because the bribes were not disclosed. See id. at 408–10.
66. Id. (quoting IOP Cast Iron Holding, LLC, 91 F. Supp. 3d at 473 (quoting In re
Lehman Bros. Sec. & ERISA Litig., 2013 WL 5730020, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 22,
2013))).
67. Teamsters Loc. 445 Freight Div. Pension Fund v. Dynex Cap., Inc., 531 F.3d
190, 195 (2d Cir. 2008).
68. See, e.g., Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 553 F.2d 1033, 1038 (7th Cir.
1977).
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II. WALLEYE, THE FACTS, AND HOW THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT ERRED
On June 22, 2020, the Seventh Circuit implicitly raised the pleading
standard for sufficiently alleging securities fraud in Walleye Trading
LLC v. AbbVie, Inc.69 In an opinion by Judge Frank Easterbrook, the
court affirmed a ruling by the Northern District of Illinois that the
alleged recklessness of an agent in creating information is not sufficient
to establish allegations of scienter, or sufficient to support scienter of the
issuer, if the information disclosed was “accurately reported” from the
information supplied to the issuer.70 The false disclosure was in relation
to a tender offer by the defendant, AbbVie, to repurchase shares through
a Dutch auction.71
A. THE FACTS AND THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT
The plaintiff—Walleye Trading LLC, a Minnesota-based brokerdealer firm72—alleged that it was injured when it purchased shares of
AbbVie stock relying on the erroneous press release AbbVie issued.73
The dispute arose from a tender offer by AbbVie, conducted by
Dutch auction, to repurchase $7.5 billion worth of shares of its own
common stock.74 AbbVie hired Computershare to act as its depository.75
A depository is a facility where something is deposited for storage
or safekeeping.76 A depository can be an entity that holds securities and

69. See generally Walleye Trading LLC v. AbbVie, Inc., 962 F.3d 975 (7th Cir.
2020) (affirming the Northern District of Illinois’ ruling to dismiss Plaintiff’s
allegations of fraud under Rule 10b-5(b) and Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act).
70. See id. at 978.
71. Walleye Trading LLC v. AbbVie, Inc., No. 18-C-05114, 2019 WL 4464392, at
*3 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 18, 2019). A Dutch auction is where “a company sets a range of
prices at which it is willing to repurchase a fixed dollar amount of stock from its
stockholders. Willing stockholders then choose a price within the specified range at
which they would sell. The company then calculates a purchase price for the stock
based on the lowest price it must spend per share such that its total expenditure is the
previously specified, fixed amount.” Id. at *1 n.1.
72. Walleye Trading LLC, BLOOMBERG, https://www.bloomberg.com/profile/
company/0977300D:US [https://perma.cc/9WG9-46A5] (last visited Aug. 23, 2020).
73. Walleye Trading LLC, 2019 WL 4464392, at *2.
74. See id. at *1.
75. Id. at *1.
76. Will
Kenton,
Depository,
INVESTOPEDIA
(May
26,
2020),
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/d/depository.asp [https://perma.cc/5RVR-M4YZ].
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aids in trading them.77 In a Dutch auction tender offer, a depository
receives the tendered shares, and at the completion of the tender offer,
either pays tenderers for their shares or returns them.78 Corporations
repurchasing shares in Dutch auction tender offers typically announce
a preliminary count of tendered shares by the depository, followed by
a final count.79 The announced price is minimally changed, if changed at
all, and the size of the auction is rarely as high as $7.5 billion—the size
of AbbVie’s Dutch auction.80
The morning after the tender offer closed, and shortly before a new
trading day was about to begin, AbbVie released a statement declaring:
“In accordance with the terms and conditions of the tender offer, and
based on the preliminary count by the depository, AbbVie expects to
acquire approximately 71.4 million shares of its common stock at a price
of $105 per share[.]”81 In that day’s trading, AbbVie’s stock price rose
from $99.47 to close at $103.01, with a trading volume of more than
31 million shares.82 Then, forty-six minutes after the market closed,
AbbVie filed a corrective statement and issued a press release noting
that the purchase price in the tender offer would actually be only
$103.00 per share.83 AbbVie’s trading price dropped significantly on the
day following the announcement, closing at $98.94.84 The corrective
statement also provided an updated stock count, explaining that

77.
78.

Id.
See, e.g., Washington Federal, Inc. Announces Final Results of Tender Offer,
BUSINESS WIRE (Mar. 12, 2021 8:00 AM), https://www.morningstar.com/news/
business-wire/20210312005086/washington-federal-inc-announces-final-results-oftender-offer [https://perma.cc/XZ2U-8P9C]; AMC Networks Announces Preliminary
Results of Modified Dutch Auction Tender Offer, A.P. NEWS (Oct. 15, 2020),
https://apnews.com/press-release/globenewswire-mobile/44f99022aea2bf9f240bc02b
68fccf91 [https://perma.cc/B22Y-TAQ9]; AMC Networks Announces Final Results of
Modified Dutch Auction Tender Offer, YAHOO NEWS (Oct. 21, 2020),
https://news.yahoo.com/amc-networks-announces-final-results-110000499.html
[https://perma.cc/Q5FL-58M8].
79. See, e.g., Walleye Trading LLC, 2019 WL 4464392, at *1.
80. See, e.g., Kenton, supra note 76.
81. Walleye Trading LLC v. AbbVie, Inc., No. 18 C 05114, 2019 WL 4464392, at
*1 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 18, 2019) (quoting defendant’s Tender Offer Statement announcing
the Auction’s preliminary results); Brief for Appellee at 2, Walleye Trading LLC v.
AbbVie, Inc., 962 F.3d 975 (7th Cir. 2020) (No. 19-3063).
82. Walleye Trading LLC, 2019 WL 4464392, at *2.
83. Id. (emphasis added); Brief for Appellee at 3, Walleye Trading LLC v.
AbbVie, Inc., 962 F.3d 975 (7th Cir. 2020) (No. 19-3063).
84. Walleye Trading LLC, 2019 WL 4464392, at *2.
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“additional shares that were validly tendered by notice of guaranteed
delivery . . . were erroneously omitted from the initial preliminary
results provided to AbbVie by Computershare.”85
A failure by Computershare to account for a substantial number of
tendered shares caused the pricing discrepancy.86 This raw data was
available to AbbVie before its initial, morning announcement, and it
presumably could have caught Computershare’s error had it doublechecked its calculations.87 The plaintiff alleged that “AbbVie executives
acted with the requisite mental state because they failed to perform
‘grammar school arithmetic’ to verify Computershare’s numbers.”88
But Judge Easterbrook rejected this allegation, writing that “neither
the statute nor any regulation requires an issuer to verify someone else’s
data before reporting them. (And, given the size of this transaction,
a sixth grader would not be the right person to do the math).”89 His
knockout punch for the plaintiff was: “Most curiously, Walleye claims
that AbbVie violated Section 10(b) and the corresponding rule because
it failed in its duty to correct the initial statement. Yet AbbVie did
correct the initial statement. That correction led to this suit! Walleye has
failed to plead a plausible Section 10(b) claim.”90
While this was Judge Easterbrook’s final statement regarding the
plaintiff’s Section 10(b) claims, he failed to discuss scienter outside of
glossing over a shorter recitation of the standard, phrased as:
“allegations of scienter must be as compelling as any opposing
inference.”91
B. THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
In Walleye Trading LLC,92 at the trial level, Judge Charles Kocoras
determined that the plaintiff’s allegations of scienter were lacking
because the “allegations concern the ‘typical’ practice by depositories to
85. Brief for Appellee at 4, Walleye Trading LLC v. AbbVie, Inc., 962 F.3d 975
(7th Cir. 2020) (No. 19-3063) (quoting updated statement).
86. Walleye Trading LLC, 2019 WL 4464392, at *2.
87. Id. at *4.
88. Walleye Trading LLC v. AbbVie, Inc., 962 F.3d 975, 978 (7th Cir. 2020).
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. See id. at 977.
92. Walleye Trading LLC v. AbbVie, Inc., No. 18 C 05114, 2019 WL 4464392
(N.D. Ill. Sept. 18, 2019).
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advise issuers of the number of shares duly tendered on each day, [the
shares’] delivery methods, the number of shares withdrawn, and the
cumulative totals for each day.”93
The data at issue were allegedly available to the defendant to
perform the simple arithmetic to confirm the numbers given.94 Alas, the
defendant did not confirm the numbers received from its agent, but
rather released them as received.95 Judge Kocoras found that the
allegations were not sufficient to satisfy the PSLRA’s heightened
pleading standard requiring particular facts providing a strong inference
the defendant acted with the required state of mind.96
Judge Kocoras opened his discussion with analysis later to be
ignored by, and possibly contrary to, Judge Easterbrook’s short
opinion.97 Judge Kocoras discussed the ex ante approach98 of the false
statement of material fact for a Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 claim.99
But he states that AbbVie correctly relayed the information given to it
by Computershare from falsity as a matter of fact.100
Judge Kocoras—in a creative manner—dismissed the plaintiff’s
pleadings as failing to satisfy the PSLRA.101 But Judge Kocoras failed to
conduct the balancing required by the PSLRA as to the reality of the
situation and gave no examples to anchor his finding. 102 Although both
Judge Kocoras and Judge Easterbrook appreciated the massive size of
the transaction, they refused to recognize a heightened standard of care
given the size of the transaction, or to even discuss potential liability for
disseminating similar materially false information.103
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Id. at *4.
Id.
Id. at *1, *4.
Id. at *4.
See id. at *3–4. See generally Walleye Trading LLC, 962 F.3d at 977.
When the statement is found to be false after the making of the statement
instead of being known as false at the time the statement was made. Cf. Walleye
Trading LLC, 2019 WL 4464392, at *3.
99. See id. (citing Higginbotham v. Baxter Int’l Inc., 495 F.3d 753, 759–60 (7th
Cir. 2007) (deriving standard from Judge Friendly’s opinion in Denny v. Barber, 576
F.2d 465, 470 (2d Cir. 1978) (There is no “fraud by hindsight.”))). Higginbotham also
discusses the intent of the PSLRA as balancing costs between baseless litigation and
hiring teams of accountants. 495 F.3d at 760.
100. See Walleye Trading LLC, 2019 WL 4464392, at *4.
101. See id.
102. See id.
103. See id.; Walleye Trading LLC v. AbbVie, Inc., 962 F.3d 975, 978 (7th Cir.
2020).
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It is clear that Judge Kocoras and Judge Easterbrook, at
a minimum, implicitly had frivolous lawsuits in mind when dismissing
Walleye. Frivolous securities lawsuits are abundant104 and need to be
disposed of by judges. But a court cannot use the existence of frivolous
lawsuits to find ways to dismiss those that do not fit into the specific
judge’s subjective view of the proscribed violations of the securities
laws.105
III. JUDGE EASTERBROOK WAS WRONG AND SHOULD BE OVERRULED
OR OVERTURNED
Judge Kocoras’ and Judge Easterbrook’s improper treatment of
Walleye rests on four pillars. First, neither Judge Kocoras or Judge
Easterbrook was clear in his rationale of determining the existence of a
material misstatement and scienter, aiming solely to dismiss the claim as
frivolous. Second, in their evaluation of scienter and determination of
whether the statement was false or misleading, neither judge separated
the relatively distinct inquiries. In the seemingly rushed decisions to
dismiss the claims at the pleading stage, the courts failed to examine the
complaint in its totality as mandated by the PSLRA.106 In evaluating the
Seventh Circuit’s precedent, Judges Kocoras and Easterbrook could
have, consistent with precedent, found that Walleye Trading’s
allegations established scienter. Third, the courts effectively created a
safe harbor by allowing ignorance of reported numbers by issuers
conducting Dutch auction tender offers. Fourth, by determining there
was no duty to review the information as reported by Computershare,
the courts undermined the spirit and force of the securities laws.

104. See, e.g., ILR Urges SEC to Protect Companies From Pandemic-Related
Securities Suits, U.S. CHAMBER INST. LEGAL REFORM (Nov. 5, 2020),
https://instituteforlegalreform.com/ilr-urges-sec-to-protect-companies-from-pandemicrelated-securities-suits [https://perma.cc/B3ER-C3R6] (discussing a petition to the SEC
due to a rise in frivolous securities lawsuits and a foreseen increase due to COVID-19
pandemic).
105. See, e.g., Higginbotham v. Baxter Int’l Inc., 495 F.3d 753, 760 (7th Cir. 2007)
(discussing the intent of the PSLRA as balancing costs between baseless litigation and
hiring teams of accountants); see also SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 819 (2002) (first
quoting United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 658 (1997); then quoting Affiliated
Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 151 (1972)).
106. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322–23 (2007).
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A. NEITHER JUDGE WAS CLEAR IN HIS RATIONALE TO DISMISS THE
PLAINTIFF’S § 10(B) AND RULE 10B-5 CLAIM
Both courts failed to consider the analysis required by the PSLRA
to properly rebut the allegations as pleaded in the plaintiff’s wellpleaded complaint; only Judge Easterbrook even referenced the
inquiry.107 Both judges relied on the typical practice of depositories to
dismiss the claims.108 Judge Kocoras began and vaguely engaged in this
analysis.109 Judge Easterbrook did not engage in this analysis and instead
took a limited approach in analyzing the plaintiff’s claims.110
1. Judge Kocoras
Judge Kocoras found that because a depository’s numbers are
typically reported as AbbVie did here, this negates any inference of
scienter under the pleading standards of the PSLRA.111 But this analysis
does not satisfy the balancing test required by the PSLRA.
The allegations of scienter must outweigh plausible innocent
explanations.112 It is an inherently comparative inquiry, and Judge
Kocoras did not explicitly engage in this analysis. 113 Even though
something may be a common practice, that does not necessarily make it
an innocent one.
Regarding a material misrepresentation,114 Judge Kocoras used the
accurate reporting of untrue information calculated by Computershare to
determine that it was not a misrepresentation.115 He used the typical
practice of depositories to determine that it was not an untrue statement.
116
With this determination, Judge Kocoras defied his own statement of

107. See generally Walleye Trading LLC, 2019 WL 4464392; Walleye Trading LLC,
962 F.3d at 975.
108. See Walleye Trading LLC, 2019 WL 4464392, at *4; Walleye Trading LLC,
962 F.3d at 978.
109. See Walleye Trading LLC, 2019 WL 4464392, at *4.
110. See Walleye Trading LLC, 962 F.3d at 978.
111. See id.
112. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 324 (2007).
113. See generally Walleye Trading LLC, 2019 WL 4464392, at *4; Tellabs, Inc.,
551 U.S. at 324.
114. See Walleye Trading LLC, 2019 WL 4464392, at *4.
115. See id.
116. Judge Kocoras’ statement that the typical practice of depositories was followed
does give the innocent explanation as an alternative to the plaintiff’s allegations. See id.
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the legal standard.117 Even further, a widespread violation of the law
does not make any specific violation less of a violation. Regardless of
such, Judge Kocoras actually engaged in this analysis, unlike Judge
Easterbrook.118
Judge Kocoras’ analysis is potentially excusable. As a trial judge,
he most likely did not want to expand the implied private right of action
to a new situation. Allowing this line of reasoning is logical for
application to the law as it stands. The case provided an easy situation
for a higher court to reverse. The preliminary count at issue provided no
benefit that could outweigh the potential reliance by investors on faulty
calculations.
2. Judge Easterbrook
Judge Easterbrook affirmed Judge Kocoras’ dismissal of the
plaintiff’s Rule 10b-5 claim without very much, if any, original
analysis.119 A judge’s opinion is typically not evaluated by originality.
In an area consisting of common law development, such as the securities
laws, when a new situation appears a judge must faithfully apply the
available precedent to reach an equitable resolution.
Instead of applying the law to the facts, Judge Easterbrook viewed
the current practice of depositories as insulation for properly pleaded
claims.120 Under this hyper-textualist approach,121 because the disclosure
stated the preliminary count (directly attributed to Computershare)
of the Dutch auction results, it was not an untrue statement.122 This was
the end of Judge Easterbrook’s analysis of Walleye Trading’s Rule 10b5 claim.123

at *4. What is still lacking is weighing of the explanations: Does the seemingly
innocent explanation abdicate any potential, and alleged, wrongdoing?
117. See id. at *3–4 (providing standard of ex ante approach in analyzing whether a
statement was untrue while sanctioning the disclosure of untrue statements based on
industry practice).
118. Compare id., with Walleye Trading LLC v. AbbVie, Inc., 962 F.3d 975, 978
(7th Cir. 2020).
119. See Walleye Trading LLC, 962 F.3d at 978.
120. See id.
121. This hyper-textualist approach applied each and every clause of the press
release instead of viewing the full intended, or effective, nature of the press release.
122. See id.
123. See generally id.
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Relying on a preliminary statement of the depository understates
the potential, and most likely correct, duty for such a large transaction.
Judge Easterbrook’s hyper-textualist approach undermines the ethos of
the securities laws and allows market manipulation so long as it facially
appears to be common industry practice, giving an innocent explanation.
B. THE INQUIRY OF SCIENTER AND THE MAKING OF AN UNTRUE
STATEMENT ARE DISTINCT (AND CAN BE DISCRETE)
In evaluating scienter and determining whether the statement was
untrue, neither judge separated the relatively distinct inquiries. 124
Existence of a material misrepresentation or omission is separate from
scienter as an element of a Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 claim.125 For
purposes of this analysis, they are somewhat conflated because the
judges utilized similar rationales to find both elements lacking.
Judge Kocoras used the same evidence to satisfy both inquiries;126
this is not improper. He still differentiated the two elements, defining
the legal standard for both inquiries and somewhat illustrating his
rationale.127 Taking the untrue statement as a postulate,128 or perhaps
applying the same hyper-textualist approach as Judge Easterbrook,
satisfies the asserted standard for scienter.129
Judge Easterbrook quickly reached the issue of scienter in a nature
reminiscent of a summary affirmance.130 He glossed over the claims of

124. See generally Walleye Trading LLC, 2019 WL 4464392; Walleye Trading LLC,
962 F.3d at 975.
125. See Anchor Bank, FSB v. Hofer, 649 F.3d 610, 617 (7th Cir. 2011) (listing
elements of § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 claim).
126. See Walleye Trading LLC, 2019 WL 4464392, at *3–4; see also supra Section
IV(1)(a).
127. See Walleye Trading LLC, 2019 WL 4464392, at *3–4.
128. The PSLRA does require analysis of opposing inferences, but this is not a
forward-looking statement. See Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S.
308, 324 (2007). At the time the statement was given, it was a current fact, to be viewed
under an ex ante, not an ex post approach. See Walleye Trading LLC, 2019 WL
4464392, at *3 (citing Higginbotham v. Baxter Int’l Inc., 495 F.3d 753, 759–60 (7th
Cir. 2007) (deriving standard from Judge Friendly’s opinion in Denny v. Barber, 576
F.2d 465, 470 (2d Cir. 1978) (There is no “fraud by hindsight.”))).
129. See Walleye Trading LLC, 962 F.3d at 978.
130. See id.
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the rest of Walleye Trading’s complaint and then viewed the final Rule
10b-5 claim as contrary to the plaintiff’s own pleadings.131
There is no interpretation of the disclosure aside from the hypertextualist approach that defeats the fact that the statement is untrue.
Under the hyper-textualist approach, all blame is effectively shifted to
Computershare, even though AbbVie was the mouthpiece of the
statement.
The misstatement was material. The effect on the market in raising
AbbVie’s share price—around four dollars, almost four points—
illustrates that at least some traders relied upon the disclosure and
considered it material.132
The Seventh Circuit’s definition of recklessness is somewhat mute
on whether this sort of misstatement would be covered.133 While
requiring something more than ordinary negligence, a showing that the
reckless conduct “presents a danger of misleading buyers or sellers that
is either known to the defendant or is so obvious that the actor must
have been aware of it.”134 It would be a somewhat flexible test without
the clarification that “the definition of ‘reckless behavior’ should not be
a liberal [test] lest any discernible distinction between ‘scienter’ and
‘negligence.’”135
The case does not squarely fit into this test: The defendant hired
Computershare, a well-known depository, to aid in a Dutch auction
tender offer, a relatively common way for an issuer to buy back equity,
and it relayed the information from Computershare to the public. 136
The caveat: This tender offer was for $7.5 billion; a massive amount
compared to other Dutch auction tender offers.137 Is it then a gross—
almost intentional—deviation from the reasonable standard of care to
release the numbers as is?

131. See id. (“Most curiously, Walleye claims that AbbVie violated § 10(b) and the
corresponding rule because it failed in its duty to correct the initial statement. Yet
AbbVie did correct the initial statement. That correction led to this suit!”).
132. See Walleye Trading LLC, 2019 WL 4464392, at *1–2 (providing numbers
illustrating the artificial, albeit natural, effect of the untrue statement on the market
price of AbbVie’s stock).
133. See Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 553 F.2d 1033, 1045 (7th Cir.
1977); Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., 554 F.2d 790, 792–93 (7th Cir. 1977).
134. Sanders, 554 F.2d at 793.
135. Id.
136. See supra pages 18–19.
137. See id.
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A complementary test has been used in the district courts of the
Seventh Circuit.138 While the issue still does not fit into this test, it
provides guidance on how to apply the law to the facts. Erroneous
accounting statements are evaluated for recklessness by (1) the
magnitude of the error, (2) the facts showing that the defendants had
prior notice of the error, and (3) whether a defendant was responsible for
calculating and disseminating financial information.139
This test is not facially applicable to the situation. The accounting
error was made by Computershare, not AbbVie,140 although AbbVie
potentially holds liability to private plaintiffs as the speaker of the
statement.141 If this test is extended to AbbVie, it would be considered
reckless in the release of the preliminary count. First, the magnitude of
error was large considering it was a $7.5 billion tender offer with
a difference in price of two dollars per share tendered.142 Second,
AbbVie had constructive notice of the error by virtue of its access to
information as alleged in the complaint. The complaint alleged that all
calculations and underlying data were accessible by AbbVie.143 Lastly,
although AbbVie was not responsible for calculating the results of the
Dutch auction, it was responsible for disseminating the information,
either by virtue of being an issuer, or through a duty assumed by making
the disclosure. AbbVie hired Computershare to act as the depository and
to calculate the results, seemingly the reason it was able to escape
liability for the misstated disclosure.
When a fact pattern does not fit squarely into the law, policy
justifications must be made to rule one way or the other. As a judgemade doctrine, the implied private right of action under Section 10(b)
and Rule 10b-5 is the province of the judiciary to develop.144 Walleye is
one such fact pattern.
By failing to recognize scienter, the Seventh Circuit and the
Northern District of Illinois morphed scienter to a more stringent
138.
139.
140.

See supra pages 13–14.
See Chu v. Sabratek Corp., 100 F. Supp. 2d 827, 838 (N.D. Ill. 2000).
See generally Walleye Trading LLC v. AbbVie, Inc., No. 18 C 05114, 2019
WL 4464392, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 18, 2019).
141. See Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 323 (2007).
142. See id. (describing amount of the tender offer and price discrepancy).
143. See id. at *4.
144. “When we deal with private actions under Rule 10b-5, we deal with a judicial
oak which has which has grown from little more than a legislative acorn.” Blue Chip
Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975) (discussing the development
of the private cause of action under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5).
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standard. This standard is inapplicable for situations such as
Computershare’s error without a more definitive showing of
recklessness—one that comes closer to showing wanton conduct.
Neither Judge Kocaras in his dismissal, nor Judge Easterbrook in his
affirmance, enunciates this standard. The standard rewards a lack of
diligence, an effective safe harbor to conduct that should be unlawful.
The Second Circuit’s test for scienter based on recklessness is
applicable in this situation. The Second Circuit will find recklessness
sufficient to establish scienter when “the defendants . . . knew facts or
had access to information suggesting their public statements were not
accurate.”145
AbbVie’s actions fit into prong three of the Second Circuit’s
standard. Aside from Judge Easterbrook’s finding that no duty to verify
the numbers existed,146 there is potential for a duty to be judicially
created for this specific situation satisfying prong four.147
Instead of being labeled as an activist judge who is “legislating
from the bench,” Judge Easterbrook could have adopted the Second
Circuit’s standard. Adopting the Second Circuit’s standard would have
allowed the plaintiff’s complaint to survive the pleading stage and let
the plaintiff have its day in court.
This is not to say that Walleye Trading had a meritorious claim;
there is still a high likelihood that its claim was frivolous, as with any
shareholder lawsuit.148 In an instance where bad actors are at play, the
Seventh Circuit’s decisions bless their actions, which are directly
contrary to the intent of the ‘34 Act. The thrust of the securities laws,
especially the implied private right of action,149 is to protect investors
and require full and fair disclosure from issuers.150

145.
146.
147.

Novak v. Kasaks, 216 F.3d 300, 311 (2d Cir. 2000) (emphasis added).
See Walleye Trading LLC v. AbbVie, Inc., 962 F.3d 975, 978 (7th Cir. 2020).
If the Seventh Circuit had been willing to create a duty, it would have. Judge
Easterbrook recognized that there was no duty and did not recognize the policy
considerations towards finding one. See id.
148. Frequent Filers: The Problems of Shareholder Lawsuits and the Path to
Reform,
U.S.
CHAMBER INST.
LEGAL
REFORM
(Feb.
27,
2014),
https://instituteforlegalreform.com/research/frequent-filers-the-problems-ofshareholder-lawsuits-and-the-path-to-reform [https://perma.cc/XA8V-UN6S].
149. The Supreme Court took twenty-five years to affirm the lower federal courts’
creation of the implied private right of action, even then only doing so by recognizing
“the unique history of Rule 10b-5.” Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 738 (1979)
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C. THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT CREATED A SAFE HARBOR FOR BLISSFUL
IGNORANCE, WHICH HAS THE POTENTIAL TO SWAY THE MARKET
Walleye creates, or illuminates, a discrete safe harbor for issuers
and their executives to evade liability by shifting responsibilities from
in-house to outside entities.151 Once responsibility shifts to outside of a
corporation, the corporation and their executives cannot be held liable
by misled investors, as long as the statement is attributed to the outsider.
This is Walleye’s effect, so long as the information—or some other
purpose for hiring an outside entity—is accurately disclosed. The safe
harbor permits inside bad actors to influence the market. Inside bad
actors can take advantage of the safe harbor’s effects to generate
potentially devastating effects on the market. Lastly, Walleye has the
prime facts to create a new duty for issuers when making public
disclosures.
When responsibility shifts outside of a corporation, the corporation
and its executives cannot be liable for misleading investors.152 Even
more troubling is the inability for sellers and buyers to receive
vindication for losses they suffered because of an issuer’s disclosure due
to the solely liable party’s status as a secondary actor. Under the implied
private right of action of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, the individual
investor can only receive his vindication from actors with primary
liability.153
AbbVie accurately reported the information relayed to it by
Computershare.154 The information was obtained by Computershare,
acting as an outside depository, on AbbVie’s behalf.155 Solely attributing
this information to Computershare, through explicit attribution and
a notice that information was subject to change, allowed AbbVie to
escape liability. The conduct of AbbVie is sufficient to establish scienter

(Powell, J., dissenting) (citing Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404
U.S. 6 (1971)).
150. See Murdock, supra note 3, at 373.
151. Cf. Walleye Trading LLC v. AbbVie, Inc., No. 18 C 05114, 2019 WL 4464392
(N.D. Ill. Sept. 18, 2019).
152. Compare McConville v. SEC, 465 F.3d 780, 787 (7th Cir. 2006) (holding
insider liable who prepared Form 10-K with financial misstatements, even though she
did not sign the form), with, Walleye Trading LLC, 2019 WL 4464392, at *4.
153. See Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Sci.-Atlanta, 552 U.S. 148, 157–58
(2008) (citation omitted).
154. See Walleye Trading LLC v. AbbVie Inc., 962 F.3d 975, 978 (7th Cir. 2020).
155. See id. at 977.
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and attaching this duty would be enough to cure a future misstatement.
Then Walleye Trading, and other harmed investors, would have
cognizable claims.
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals and its associated district
courts have not sufficiently defined what conduct would be suitable to
defeat the protection generally afforded through explicit attribution by
a speaker to another. Under the current Seventh Circuit framework,
aggrieved investors have no path to vindication for their harm.156 The
Southern District of New York has, by contrast, defined what conduct
would be able to push the weight of the scale to support a finding of
scienter.157
As the Supreme Court has set out: “[T]he proper inquiry is whether
a plaintiff sufficiently pleads that a particular defendant ‘made it
necessary or inevitable that any falsehood would be contained in the
statement.’”158 In the instant case, as alleged, “Computershare’s duties
were largely ministerial; they included accepting tenders of shares and
cataloging how many shares were tendered for auction and in what
form.”159 AbbVie had this information, released the preliminary
statement, and waited until an entire day of trading passed before issuing
a corrective statement. Performance of solely ministerial duties, while
those duties with a material effect are contracted away, should make no
difference in this case. Walleye Trading alleged that AbbVie, at an
unknown time, had actual knowledge of the incorrect statement and
failed to correct until after the trading day had ended.160
A lapse of judgement by an issuer performing its own calculations
of this magnitude would likely establish scienter. This would not
establish primary liability for those traditionally secondarily liable; this
situation would preserve a duty that Walleye seemingly establishes can
be contracted away.
Another set of standards can be used from the Second Circuit Court
of Appeals that there is liability if GAAP is not followed in the
preparation of an inaccurate public statement and the issuer had access
156.
157.

See generally supra Part III.
See Doubleline Cap. LP v. Odebrecht Fin., Ltd., 323 F. Supp. 3d 393, 452
(S.D.N.Y. 2018) (quoting IOP Cast Iron Holdings, LLC v. J.H. Whitney Cap. Partners,
LLC, 91 F. Supp. 3d 456, 473 (S.D.N.Y. 2015)).
158. Id.
159. Brief for Appellant at 4, Walleye Trading LLC v. AbbVie, Inc., 962 F.3d 975
(7th Cir. 2020) (No. 19-3063).
160. See id. at 6–7.
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to the facts of the misstatement.161 Without discovery, it should be
sufficient to allege that AbbVie’s access to information should have
prompted it to confirm the calculations.
The safe harbor permits inside bad actors—or incompetent
insiders—to influence the market, shielded by a so-called ignorance of
outside-actors recklessness. Inside bad actors can take advantage of the
safe harbor to generate potentially devastating effects on the market.
Discovery of AbbVie’s actual process is not available because the
Walleye court dismissed Walleye Trading’s complaint. Without
discovery, the courts are unable to determine whether bad actors
intended to influence the market. AbbVie may, or may not, be guilty of
bad intentions; Walleye bars discovery in similar situations where bad
actors intended to influence the market.
D. THE RULINGS UNDERMINE THE PURPOSE AND DRIVING FORCE OF THE
SECURITIES LAWS
The securities laws historically place a heightened duty on
sophisticated investors to investigate; this consequently enforces
a policy in protection of unsophisticated investors.162 The general ethos
of the securities laws is investor protection.163 The PSLRA has
alternative intentions, but the exception can swallow the intent of the
whole. Sophisticated investors bear greater risk with their unprotected
investments, but they do so with their own investigation. Much has
changed since the enactment of the ‘34 Act; entities such as Robinhood
now allow everyday people to trade as if they are a sophisticated day
trader.
As previously stated, a comparative analysis is used when
determining whether to establish a new duty.164 The benefit to
unsophisticated investors of confirming calculations prior to release, or

161. See Novak v. Kasaks, 216 F.3d 300, 311 (2d Cir. 2000). The Seventh Circuit
disagreed with the Second Circuit’s interpretation of the PSLRA in determining the
standard for pleadings and their requirements as intended by Congress in Makor Issues
& Right, Ltd. v. Tellabs, Inc., 437 F.3d 588, 601 (7th Cir. 2006), rev’d, 551 U.S. 308
(2007). While the Second Circuit’s interpretation of the pleading was stricter than that
decided by the Supreme Court, the Seventh Circuit’s interpretation was expressly
overturned. See id.; Tellabs, Inc., 551 U.S. at 322.
162. Cf. Terra Sec. ASA Konkursbo v. Citigroup, Inc., 740 F. Supp. 2d 441, 455–56
(S.D.N.Y. 2010).
163. See generally supra Part I.
164. See generally supra Part II.
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shifting the duty to confirm to the issuer, outweighs the additional cost
of confirming final calculations before issuing a press release.
The securities laws have developed through the federal common law,
and the “judicial oak which has grown from little more than a legislative
acorn”165 can continue to grow.
Two proper solutions exist to remedy the safe harbor Walleye
created:166 (1) The Seventh Circuit can find a duty to confirm
calculations of outsiders; or (2) the Seventh Circuit can adopt the
Second Circuit’s standards interpreted to find liability for AbbVie.
The new duty would shift liability for recklessness from outside
contractors, or secondary violators, to issuers, or primary violators.
In this situation, the size of the transaction will have a direct effect on
the issuer’s stock price.167 The tender offer had a direct effect on the
market due to the massive scale of the offer at $7.5 billion—almost five
percent of the ABBV market cap at the time.168 The duty would be
effective in curbing unnecessary disclosures, providing benefits to the
typical investor following market-related press releases. Further, the
duty could only benefit the market. By preventing disclosure of
potentially misleading information related artificial elevations and drops
in an issuer’s stock price will no longer occur, effectively balancing out
to the natural ebbs and flows of the market.
While disclosure is typically beneficial for the market, the
preliminary-count press release for a tender offer is redundant as the
final calculations will later be released. Failing to release preliminary
calculations may facially be contrary to Regulation FD, promoting
disclosure of information to the public that may otherwise be shared
through selective disclosure.169 But the preliminary press release can
only be intended to influence the issuer’s share price, and it is likely bad
actors will do so. By creating this duty, at a minimum, issuers could

165.
166.

Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975).
Other alternatives, such as SEC rulemaking and the Seventh Circuit being
overruled by the Supreme Court, are much less likely and therefore omitted.
167. As evidenced by the price escalation and drop from the preliminary
announcement to release of the corrected preliminary count. See generally supra Part
III.
168. ABBV Market Cap Chart, MACROTRENDS.NET, https://www.macrotrends.net/
stocks/charts/ABBV/abbvie/market-cap [https://perma.cc/6LLG-65SW] (last visited
Jan. 4, 2021) (Market cap as of May 30, 2018, when preliminary statement issued).
169. See 17 C.F.R. § 243 (2011).
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forgo a preliminary count press release or limit the disclosure to solely
shareholders that tendered shares.
Alternatively, the Seventh Circuit could adopt the Second Circuit’s
potentially applicable precedent, as it relates to preparing financial
statements, allowing an inference of recklessness when the issuer had
access to information that would have shown its public statements were
inaccurate.170 This would effectively have the same result as imputing
a new duty when information is calculated by a third party. Under the
Second Circuit’s attribution framework and considering the statement
AbbVie made was explicitly attributed to Computershare,171 AbbVie
would have had made it necessary—or inevitable—that its statement
would contain Computershare’s false statement.172 It is also possible
Computershare’s statement would have to be ratified by AbbVie’s
conduct, which likely did occur.173
CONCLUSION
The Walleye safe harbor is bad for unsophisticated investors. This
error is relatively extreme. If there is no standard to evaluate a
potentially heightened duty—or any version of respondeat superior
liability—a bad actor will intentionally and drastically take advantage of
this rule. Reform is necessary to preserve the intent of the securities
laws. The Seventh Circuit, or the Supreme Court, must rework this
standard. Attribution, in and of itself, cannot purge the taint from
a materially misleading statement when the statement was prepared and
reviewable by its maker. Is it not contradictory to charge a market
participant with the duty not to lie, then allow him to act like the
proverbial three wise monkeys?

170.
171.
172.

See Novak v. Kasaks, 216 F.3d 300, 311 (2d Cir. 2000).
See generally supra Part III.
See Doubleline Cap. LP v. Odebrecht Fin., Ltd., 323 F. Supp. 3d 393, 452
(S.D.N.Y. 2018) (quoting IOP Cast Iron Holding, LLC v. J.H. Whitney Cap. Partners,
LLC, 91 F. Supp. 3d 456, 473 (S.D.N.Y. 2015)).
173. See Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Sci.-Atlanta, 552 U.S. 148, 158 (2008).

